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214 
Note 
 
The European Central Bank’s Securities Markets 
Programme: Why a Necessary Response to the 
European Debt Crisis Should Come to an End 
 
Peter Doely* 
 
The European Union Member States (“Member States”) 
created the European Central Bank (“ECB”) to provide price 
stability to the eurozone. The ECB is highly independent 
because central bank independence is directly correlated to 
providing price stability. In order to preserve the ECB’s 
independence, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”) provides legal safeguards. One safeguard is a 
prohibition on the ECB purchasing government bonds directly 
from Member States. This safeguard helps to ensure that the 
ECB does not monetize the debt of Member States, and it helps 
to preserve the distinction between monetary policy and fiscal 
policy. 
In early 2010, the finances of several Member States, most 
notably Greece, were in dire straits and investors began to 
doubt those countries’ ability to repay their debts. Government 
bond yields for those countries began to rise precipitously. In 
addition to other European efforts to quell the crisis, the ECB 
implemented the Securities Markets Programme (“SMP”) in 
order to drive down the yields for those countries’ bonds and 
provide liquidity to the securities markets. The SMP involved 
the ECB purchasing government bonds from secondary 
markets. 
The ECB claims a legal basis for the SMP by 
characterizing it as necessary for monetary policy. The ECB 
reasons that the SMP is necessary to reestablish order in 
dysfunctional markets and to preserve its transmission 
 
* J.D Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
University of Iowa. The author thanks his wife, Rachel Doely, for her support 
which made all the research and drafts possible. He also thanks the MJIL 
editors and staff for their comments and direction throughout this article’s 
development. All errors and omissions are the author’s alone. 
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mechanism for monetary policy. Critics have claimed that the 
SMP has been a Trojan horse for fiscal policy. The ECB, they 
claim, is primarily concerned with helping to relieve the debt 
burden of potentially insolvent governments, and that acting 
for such reasons is an implicit breach of the prohibition on debt 
monetization. 
This Note examines the monetary and fiscal justifications 
for the SMP and discusses whether it compromises the ECB’s 
independence. Part I examines the legal and economic bases for 
the ECB’s independence and the events that necessitated the 
SMP. Part II compares the plausible monetary and fiscal 
reasons for the SMP. Finally, after examining options for 
modifying the ECB’s ability to act, this Note concludes that the 
Member States should limit the amount of government bonds 
that the ECB is able to purchase in order to safeguard against 
debt monetization, to preserve ECB independence and to 
ensure the ECB fulfills its mandate of price stability. 
 
I. THE ECB, THE EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES, AND 
THE CRISIS 
In 1992 European Member States signed the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”) and created the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (“EMU”).1  This Treaty2 established the 
framework of the European System of Central Banks (the 
“ESCB”), including the ECB and central banks of Member 
States.3 In addition, it laid out the ESCB’s responsibilities in 
the EMU:  
The primary objective of the European System of 
Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. 
Without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the 
 
 1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
 2. For ease of reference, this Note will use the Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter 
TEU]. This Note will also use the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 
[hereinafter TFEU] and Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. 
(C 83) 230 [hereinafter ECB Statute]. 
 3. TFEU art. 4(2)(a). 
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Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act 
in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition, 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources, 
and in  compliance with the principles set out in 
Article 119.4 
First and foremost, the ECB should “maintain price 
stability.”5 In order to maintain price stability, a central bank 
must keep inflation at a low and consistent level.6 This is 
desirable because it allows participants in the economy to plan 
and invest in the future with an accurate idea of the return on 
their investments. This stability promotes sustained and 
smooth economic growth.7 If price stability is maintained, the 
ECB is also able to “support the general economic policies in 
the Union,”8 though this goal is distinctly secondary.9 Member 
States, not the ECB, are responsible for determining and 
implementing their economic policies.10 
As a means to price stability, the Member States made the 
ECB what some have called “the world’s most legally 
independent central bank.”11 There is a strong connection 
between the insulation of central bankers from political 
pressure and price stability.12 Because inflationary pressure 
 
 4. TFEU art. 127. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 388–89. (2d ed. 1989). The ECB has interpreted the price 
stability mandate to require inflation under 2% in the medium term. Press 
Release, Governing Council of the European Cent. Bank, A Stability-oriented 
Monetary Policy Strategy for the ESCB (Oct. 13, 1998), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr981013_1.en.html. 
 7. See MISHKIN, supra note 6. 
 8. TFEU art. 127. 
 9. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, 
Introductory Statement with Q&A at Frankfurt am Main (Mar. 6, 2008), 
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2008/html/is080306.en.html 
(“We have one needle in our compass, which is price stability.”). 
 10. See TFEU art. 120 (“Member states shall conduct their economic 
policies . . . .”). 
 11. KARL KALTENTHALER, POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK 70 (2006). 
 12. See DAVID HOWARTH & PETER LOEDEL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK: THE NEW EUROPEAN LEVIATHAN? 119 (2003) (“Most empirical studies 
have shown that countries with independent central banks achieve 
substantially lower rates of inflation than countries in which the central bank 
is controlled directly by the government.”); Patrick Deller, The European 
System of Central Banks: Quo Vadis?, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 197–98 (1999) 
(“[T]he independence of central banks is a prerequisite to the achievement of 
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can lead to higher economic activity and employment in the 
short term, inflation can work to the short term advantage of 
governments.13 Thus, those who answer to an electorate are 
more likely to encourage inflation because elections occur in the 
short term. If they do, as a result inflationary pressure creates 
uncertainty for market participants and discourages 
investment.14 
Politicians may also pressure the central bank to alleviate 
sovereign debt already accrued through a process called “debt 
monetization.”15 This is a process through which the central 
bank directly or indirectly purchases sovereign debt, which 
replaces securities in the market with currency, increases the 
monetary base and may lead to inflation.16 This process 
relieves the government of debt in two ways: first, all payments 
it makes to the central bank for its debt are then circulated 
back to the government, and second, inflation reduces the real 
value of the sovereign debt.17 Therefore, debt monetization also 
allows politicians to spend without incurring the pushback 
from direct taxation, or it may act as an escape valve if the 
country is threatening default.18 
 
A. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
Central bank independence is divided into three categories: 
political, personal and financial.19 A direct and unequivocal 
prohibition of anyone influencing the ECB’s decisions ensures 
its political independence.20 Personal and financial 
 
stable prices.”). 
 13. See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 577-81. 
 14. See id., at 388–89, 577–81. 
 15. See id., at 364–66, 568–76, 581–83. 
 16. Id. See also HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133. Even if debt 
monetization should be viewed relative to inflation expectations, see  Daniel L. 
Thornton, Monetizing the Debt, 14 ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1, FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2010) available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/10/ES1014.pdf, this is still the 
process through which a central bank would finance government spending. 
 17. See Thornton, supra note 16. 
 18. See Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Remarks on Central Bank Independence and Sovereign Default 
at the Sovereign Debt Seminar (Sept. 26, 2011) available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/kocherlakota_speech_Sept-
26-2011.pdf. 
 19. E.g., HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 128–36. The terminology 
for categorizing elements of independence varies. E.g., Deller, supra note 12, 
at 201–02 (referring to political independence as “institutional independence”). 
 20. See TFEU art. 130. 
DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:51 PM 
218 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 22:1 
 
independence act to reinforce political independence by 
preventing politicians from removing officials or withholding 
funding in reaction to an unpopular decision by the central 
bank.21 Long tenures and removability only for cause protect 
ECB officials’ personal independence.22 Though Member States 
initially capitalized the ECB with five billion euros, it now 
operates off the revenue provided by its monetary operations 
which preserves the ECB’s financial independence.23 
Another aspect of financial independence is how easily 
governments can force central banks to monetize their debt.24 
Generally, the more restrictive governments’ access to central 
bank credit is, the more independent central banks are.25 For 
instance, there may be legal restrictions on the amount of debt 
that the central bank may purchase, the maturity of the debt, 
whether the debt is collateralized, the interest rate paid 
relative to market rates, whether the central bank is allowed to 
purchase sovereign debt on the primary market or the reasons 
for which the central bank can purchase debt.26 Ideally, an 
independent central bank should not be allowed to purchase 
government bonds because a central bank “can easily bypass 
the prohibition on deficit financing” by purchasing government 
 
 21. See HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 130–32, n. 89; Deller, 
supra note 12, at 202–06. 
 22. The Executive Board Members’ terms are eight years, TFEU art. 
283(2), and national central bank governors will have at least five year terms, 
HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 131. In addition, an Executive Board 
member may only be excused if they are no longer able to fulfill their duties or 
if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct. ECB Statute art. 11(4). 
 23. ECB Statute art. 28(1); Capital Subscription, European Central Bank, 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html (last updated Dec. 28, 
2011). 
 24. HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133. These types of limitations 
have been called “the most relevant of institutional guarantees of central bank 
independence.” ANAND CHANDAVARKAR, CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 227 (1996). See also supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Alex Cukierman, Seven B. Webb & Bilin Neyapti, Measuring the 
Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes, 6 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 353, 357 (1992). 
 26. See, e.g., John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The 
Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 70, 86–87 
(1998); Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti, supra note 25, at 359 (providing metrics 
based on different levels of restrictions to each of these criteria); Robert 
Sparve, Central Bank Independence Under European Union and Other 
International Standards, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF 
CENTRAL BANKS 269, 279–80 (2005) (noting the ECB electing not to use the 
IMF’s recommendation of prohibiting quasi-fiscal activities). 
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bonds on the secondary markets.27 However, purchasing 
sovereign debt or using sovereign debt as collateral, which may 
result in the debt being acquired by a central bank, is often 
necessary to implement monetary policy and is largely seen as 
unproblematic as long as quasi-fiscal operations are 
prohibited.28 
Article 123 of the TFEU creates the clearest barrier to debt 
monetization for the ECB: 
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit 
facility with the European Central Bank or with 
the central banks of the Member States 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘national central 
banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States shall be 
prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from 
them by the European Central Bank or national 
central banks of debt instruments.29 
The TFEU clearly prohibits the direct purchase of Member 
States’ sovereign debt by the ECB,30 but it is silent as to when 
the ECB may purchase that debt from the secondary markets. 
The Treaty likely only prohibits direct purchase of Member 
State debt because the ECB may need to hold that debt in order 
to implement monetary policy. The ECB primarily uses open 
market operations to implement monetary policy.31 Through 
 
 27. PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY POLICY: GOALS, INSTITUTIONS, 
STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS 214–15 (2001). See also HOWARTH & LOEDEL, 
supra note 12, at 133. 
 28. See The Eurosystem’s Instruments: Open Market Operations, 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (last visited Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/intro/html/index.en.html#operations 
(describing the open market operations of the ECB, which include refinancing 
operations – for which collateral must be pledged – and fine tuning operations 
– for which the ECB may directly purchase sovereign debt from the secondary 
market; open market operations are aimed at manipulating the money supply, 
i.e. implementing monetary policy). Prohibiting quasi-fiscal activities can be 
prohibited by explicitly limiting what actions the central bank may take. See 
Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Autonomy, Accountability and Governance: 
Conceptual Framework, INT’L MONETARY FUND 7 (Aug. 18, 2004), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/lybek.pdf. 
 29. TFEU art. 123 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. ECB Statute art. 18; FRANCOIS NAUDIN, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK: A BANK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 187–90 (2000). 
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these operations the ECB engages with banks to buy, sell, lend 
and borrow claims and marketable instruments.32 When the 
ECB extends credit to banks, the banks must provide 
“adequate collateral.”33 Because the ECB has stringent criteria 
for what constitutes “adequate collateral,” few marketable 
instruments qualify.34 Of these, “the best available tier one 
asset is local sovereign debt.”35 In addition, the ECB through 
“fine tuning operations” buys and sells outright marketable 
instruments including sovereign debt.36  Therefore, by engaging 
in these operations the ECB may acquire sovereign debt 
through default or purchase.  
 
B. ECONOMIC RESTRAINTS FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
The Member States exclusively determine the economic 
policies of the EU with guidance from the Treaties between the 
Members.37 Member States, however, foresaw that 
irresponsible economic policies of individual Member States 
could have implications for the whole EU. For example, if a 
Member State accrues too much debt and threatens to default, 
other Member States or an EU institution, such as the ECB, 
may need to rescue that Member State in order to preserve 
stability in the EU.38 To avoid such a situation, the TEU 
dictates that “Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits.”39 The Member States empowered the European 
Commission to monitor the development of the budgetary 
situation in each Member State.40  Protocol No. 12, annexed to 
 
 32. ECB Statute art. 18(1). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See NAUDIN, supra note 31, at 192–94. The categories of eligible 
market assets, as laid out by the ECB, include: central government securities, 
regional government securities, uncovered bank bonds, covered bank bonds, 
corporate bonds, asset backed securities and other marketable securities. 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, COLLATERAL DATA (Oct. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/paym/pdf/collateral/collateral_data.pdf?8b7bd994d87f09679
e7665319d2e8ea5. See generally, Collateral, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/html/index.en.html. 
 35. See NAUDIN, supra note 31, at 194. 
 36. The Eurosystem’s Instruments: Open Market Operations, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 37. TFEU art. 120.  
 38.  For example, the ECB could monetize that country’s debt. See 
HOWARTH & LOEDEL, supra note 12, at 133; Kocherlakota, supra note 18. See 
also supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 39. TFEU art. 126(1).  
 40. TFEU art. 126(2). 
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the TEU, limits public debts and deficits to 60% of GDP and an 
annual rate of 3% of GDP respectively.41 To give these 
provisions teeth, the EU implemented the Stability and Growth 
Pact (the “SPG”).42 The SPG is made up of a preventative arm, 
which requires Members States to report their fiscal outlook to 
the EU,43 and a dissuasive arm, which gives the EU the ability 
to warn and sanction non-compliant Member States. 44   
The Treaty and the SGP, however, failed to keep the 
Member States’ fiscal houses in order. Facing sluggish growth 
and excessive deficits,45  the Member States elected to amend 
the SGP rather than comply by its provisions.46  The ECB 
voiced concern that the SGP’s new impotence would 
“undermine confidence in the fiscal framework of the European 
Union (“EU”) and the sustainability of public finances in the 
euro area Member States,” as well as the price stability of the 
EU.47 Nonetheless, the ECB’s warnings to Member States went 
largely unheeded, and the Member States amended the SGP so 
that it would have little power to constrain the Member 
States.48 
 
 
 41. Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 279. 
 42. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 
17 June, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 1 (EC). 
 43. See Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the Strengthening of 
the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and 
Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC). 
 44. See Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on Speeding Up and 
Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Debt Procedure, art. 2, 1997 
O.J. (L 209) 6 (EC). If the EU decided to sanction a Member State, the 
Member State will be required to deposit a sum, ranging from 0.2% to 0.5% of 
its GDP with the ECB, and if the its deficit was not reduced, the deposit woud 
be forfeited. Id., at arts. 11–16; KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 98. 
 45. See KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 98–99. Compare Real GDP 
Growth Rate, EUROSTAT, - 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&lan
guage=en&pcode=tec00115 (last updated Nov. 10, 2012), with Government 
Deficit/Surplus, Debt and Associated Data, EUROSTAT, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_dd_edpt1&lang=
en (last updated Oct. 26, 2012). 
 46. KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 101–02. 
 47. Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Statement of the Governing 
Council on the ECOFIN Council’s Report on Improving the Implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050321.en.html; KALTENTHALER, 
supra note 11, at 99. 
 48. KALTENTHALER, supra note 11, at 99. 
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C. SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
The EU, like much of the world, suffered through a deep 
recession starting in 2008.49 While the entire EU was still 
working to regain traction, Greece in early 2010 revealed that 
the size of their deficit was much larger than it had previously 
disclosed.50 This disclosure, combined with Greece’s already 
substantial debt, led market participants to question Greece’s 
ability to repay their debt.  As a result, yields on Greek bonds 
began to rise precipitously in April 2010.51 Investors’ fears also 
led to increased yields on government bonds from countries 
that either had very high debt levels and a weak recovery, such 
as Portugal, or had been particularly ravaged by the recession, 
such as Spain and Ireland.52 Indeed, in the summer of 2011, 
the yields on both Spain and Italy’s bonds rose dramatically as 
investors began to fear they would not be able to pay their 
debts.53 
For governments already struggling to accelerate their 
economies and collect tax revenue, raising bond yields posed 
another burden: in order to continue borrowing from lenders, 
these countries had to pay a risk premium of higher interest 
rates on the debt.54 However, increasing interest rates to 
compensate for investors’ fear of default actually increases the 
likelihood of default.55 If it costs a country more to borrow 
 
 49. See Real GDP Growth Rate, supra note 45. 
 50. Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovere
ign_debt_crisis/index.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2012). 
 51. See id.; Greece Govt. Bond 10 Year Acting as Benchmark, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GGGB10YR:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 
21, 2012). 
 52.  Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, supra note 50; see also 
Portuguese Government Bond 10YR Note Portugal PL, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GSPT10YR:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 21, 
2012); Spanish Government Generic Bonds - 10YR Note, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GSPG10YR:IND/chart (last visited Sept. 21, 
2012); Ireland Government Bonds 10 Year Note Generic Bid Yield, 
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GIGB10YR:IND/chart (last 
updated Oct. 11, 2011) (demonstrating the increased bond yields in these 
countries). 
 53. Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, supra note 50; see also Italy Govt 
Bonds 10 Year Gross Yield, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GBTPGR10:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 
21, 2012); Spanish Government Generic Bonds - 10YR Note, supra note 52. 
 54. See Derek Thompson, What is the ‘Contagion Effect’?, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 18, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2010/05/what-is-the-contagion-effect/56858/.  
 55. Id. 
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money, it is more likely that the country will not be able to 
borrow enough to meet their current liabilities.  The potential 
contagion in other countries compounded the crisis, and a 
series of defaults threatened to bring the EU to its knees in 
early 2010.56  
 
D. EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
In order to quell market fears and prevent defaults, the 
IMF and European Member States created a financial safety 
net for Greece which Greece then tapped into in late April 
2010.57 In addition, the leaders of the Member States agreed to 
create the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) on 
May 9, 2010.58 The purpose of the EFSF is “to preserve 
financial stability of Europe’s monetary union by providing 
temporary financial assistance to euro area Member States if 
needed.” Member States committed €780 billion to the EFSF.59  
In conjunction with the creation of the EFSF, on May 10, 
2010 the ECB acted to stabilize financial markets by launching 
the Securities Market Programme (the “SMP”).60 The SMP 
allowed the ECB to purchase sovereign debt from public and 
private securities markets in order to drive down interest rates 
to provide depth and liquidity to those markets.61 In addition to 
providing liquidity to government bond markets, the ECB also 
‘sterilized’ its purchases by absorbing an amount of liquidity 
from the economy which was equal to the amount of 
government bonds purchased.62  
 
 56. “Contagion” refers to the investor paranoia that if one country 
defaults on their debt promises, more countries will. Id. 
 57. Timeline: Euro Zone Debt Crisis, REUTERS (June 10, 2010, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/10/us-eurozone-events-
idUSTRE6593G320100610. 
 58. Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, Establishing a 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 2010 O.J. (L 118) 1; About 
EFSF, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FUND, 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The 
lending capacity of the EFSF is currently €440 billion. 
 59. Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY 
FUNDFUNDFACILITY, 1 (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf. 
 60. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, ECB MONTHLY BULL. 59, 
72 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. The ECB sterilizes by opening seven day deposits to banks. See The 
ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73. See also 
Complete data set of History of All ECB Open Market Operations, EUROPEAN 
CENT. BANK, http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/ 
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The SMP led the targeted government bond yields to drop, 
temporarily abating tensions.63 During the course of the SMP, 
the ECB has purchased bonds from Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and Ireland in order to curb rising yields on those 
countries’ bonds. 64 As of August 20, 2012, the ECB has 
purchased €211.5 billion under the SMP.65 During the lifetime 
of the SMP, there has been speculation from market 
participants that the ECB will continue to act as long as 
markets exert pressure.66  
Member States have also signed two new treaties in order 
for the EU to be better equipped to deal with such crises: the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (“Treaty on Stability”)67 and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(“Treaty Establishing ESM”).68 The Treaty on Stability 
reinvigorates the fiscal oversight of Member States and again 
gives the EU the ability to levy sanctions against delinquent 
Member States.69 The Treaty Establishing ESM creates a 
permanent rescue fund to replace EFSF and acts as a lender of 
 
top_history.en.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011); Summary of Ad Hoc 
Communication, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, 
http://www.ecb.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/communication.en.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
 63. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73. 
 64. Paul Carrel, ECB Says Will “Actively Implement” Bond-Buying, 
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2011, 5:53 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/07/us-crisis-ecb-
idUSTRE7762PE20110807. See also, e.g., Greece Govt Bond 10 Year Acting as 
Benchmark, supra note 51; Ireland Government Bonds 10 Year Note Generic 
Bid Yield, supra note 52 (depicting the rising bond yields in Greece and 
Ireland in chart form). 
 65. See ECB Eurosystem Securities Market Program, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ECBCSMP:IND/chart (last updated Sept. 14, 
2012). 
 66. See Jack Ewing & Raphael Minder, Stocks Surge as a Fed Statement 
Sinks In: Central Bank Props Up Spain and Italy, for Now, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
10, 2011, at B.1 (“They will do whatever it takes because they will be forced to 
. . . .”). 
 67. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf [hereinafter Treaty on 
Stability]. 
 68. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 1, 2012, 
No. D/12/3, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/12/3&type=HT
ML [hereinafter Treaty Establishing ESM]. 
 69. See, e.g., Treaty on Stability, supra note 67, art. 8(2). 
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last resort to distressed Member States.70 
A combination of efforts from the European Governments, 
the IMF and the ECB has prevented any outright defaults by 
European governments or meltdowns in the European markets. 
There is little doubt that such actions helped to stave off the 
pain that would have resulted from a disorderly breakdown of 
European public finances. Furthermore, the ECB has 
vigorously defended the legality of the SMP. Yet there has been 
a growing dissent that the ECB, while helping save the 
markets in the short term, has overstepped the boundaries of 
its power and engaged in debt monetization. This, critics argue, 
has also undercut price stability and the independence upon 
which the ECB and the European economies depend. 
 
II.  LEGALITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SMP 
The SMP had the effect of driving down yields in the 
markets for select government bonds.71 Lower bond yields have 
both fiscal and monetary implications. A fiscal implication is 
that those governments are able to borrow money at a lower 
interest rate.72 This has aided those governments in staying 
solvent. A monetary implication is that those government bond 
markets moved more freely which enabled the ECB to use 
those markets to implement its monetary policy effectively.73 
The ECB’s motivation in implementing the SMP will therefore 
 
 70. See generally Treaty Establishing ESM, supra 68, art. 23–24 
(outlining the dividend policy and establishment of a reserve fund). 
 71. The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 72. 
 72. See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 73. The ECB, as the sole issuer of Euros, determines the short term 
interest rate for the European money market through its open market 
operations, standing facilities, and minimum reserve requirements for credit 
institutions. See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, 
Speech at the 38th Economic Conference of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank: The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions in Financial 
Markets (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100531_2.en.html [hereinafter 
The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions]. The ECB then relies on 
functioning credit markets to affect the cost of credit for consumers, the 
amount of economic activity and, thus, price levels. Id. See generally The 
Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, 
Feb. 2011, at 5, 9–13, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/gendoc2011en.pdf (presenting the 
operational framework for the Eurosystem’s monetary policies and 
procedures); Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy, EUROPEAN CENT. 
BANK, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (depicting a flow chart demonstrating the process 
through which monetary policy decisions affect the economy). 
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largely depend on which results it has been trying to effectuate 
and which results were simply ancillary. 
For legal observers therein lies the problem: depending on 
which motivations and outcomes the ECB intended in 
implementing the SMP, its actions are more or less legally 
dubious. The ECB was explicitly created to determine and 
implement monetary policy in order to maintain price 
stability.74 At the same time, Member States are to determine 
and implement economic, or fiscal, policies.75 It is true that the 
Member States opted not to ban the ECB specifically from 
engaging in fiscal activities76 and that the ECB may support 
the “general economic policies in the Union” if it does not 
threaten price stability.77 However, the structural separation of 
monetary and fiscal responsibilities in the TEU78 and the 
ECB’s insistence that it acts solely for monetary reasons79 are 
strong indicators that the ECB may not act for fiscal reasons. If 
so, the ECB may have overstepped the powers the Member 
States ceded to it and violated the TEU. 
 
A. THE SMP AS MONETARY POLICY 
The ECB has insisted that the SMP is a tool of monetary 
policy on three grounds: first, it complies with the letter of the 
Treaty, second, it is necessary to implement monetary policy, 
and third, the ECB has continued to maintain price stability.80 
 
 74. TFEU art. 127(1)–(2). 
 75. Id., art. 120 (“Member States shall conduct their economic policies”). 
 76. This would have provided a clearer boundary. See Lybek, supra note 
28, at 7 (“The potential for quasi-fiscal activities should be eliminated in the 
central bank law, which can be done by explicitly prohibiting activities that 
are not provided for under the act . . . .”). 
 77. TFEU art. 127. Therefore, while not entirely banned from engaging in 
such activities, the ECB is significantly limited in its ability to support 
governments in a direct or individualized way. 
 78. See id., art. 120–26 (economic policy) and id. art. 127–33 (monetary 
policy). See also TFEU art. 127 (“The primary objective of the European 
System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 79. See Trichet supra, note 9 (“We have one needle in our compass, which 
is price stability.”). 
 80.   See, e.g., Jürgen Stark, Member of Exec. Bd., European Cent. Bank, 
IMFS Distinguished Lecture: Central Banking after the Financial Crisis (Feb. 
21, 2011), http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110221.en.html 
[hereinafter Central Banking after the Financial Crisis]; The ECB’s Response 
to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73. 
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In addition, some members point to the ECB’s restraint in the 
size and duration of the SMP to demonstrate its monetary 
purposes.81 
 
i. The Treaty’s Text 
The ECB primarily exists to maintain price stability.82 The 
ECB is charged with “defin[ing] and implement[ing] the 
monetary policy of the Union,”83 and the ECB is empowered to 
make “decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks 
entrusted . . . under the Treaties . . . .”84 In order to do this, the 
ECB under the ECB Statute is able to “operate in the financial 
markets by buying and selling outright . . . claims and 
marketable instruments.”85 Except for transactions which the 
Member States prohibited the ECB from engaging in, such as 
directly purchasing government bonds,86 the Member States in 
the letter of treaties have granted the ECB a great deal of 
latitude in establishing and implementing monetary policy. 
It remains unclear what boundaries exist for the ECB 
while acting under the auspices of monetary policy. This is in 
part because “[t]he European Central Bank . . . is loath to 
acknowledge any limitations on its monetary policy arsenal.”87 
Despite this, some ECB officials have publically described the 
impetus for the SMP and some reasons for its necessity. These 
reasons, they argue, establish that the SMP is a tool of 
monetary, not fiscal, policy; if it is a tool of monetary policy, 
then the SMP is a legitimate tool for the ECB to use. 
 
ii. Necessary for Monetary Policy 
In May 2010, the ECB, along with the rest of the world, 
observed tensions and volatility in the financial markets.88 The 
ECB identified the European debt markets, particularly the 
 
 81. See Central Banking after the Financial Crisis, supra note 80. 
 82. TFEU art. 127(1). 
 83. Id., art. 127(2). 
 84. Id., art. 132(1). 
 85. ECB Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1). 
 86. TFEU art. 123(1). 
 87. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66. 
 88. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Introductory 
Statement at the Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100621.en.html [hereinafter 
Introductory Statement]. 
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sovereign debt markets, as the epicenter of the tension.89 The 
ECB saw an increasing risk that the markets would become so 
impaired by the volatility that the ECB’s transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy would no longer be able to 
function.90 Without being able to implement monetary policy, 
the ECB would not be able to maintain price stability. 
Then-President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, 
identified three channels for monetary policy which 
malfunctioning government bond markets were impeding.91 
First, there is the price channel.92 Because the price of 
government bonds influences the price of non-government 
credit, the soaring interest rates on government bonds can 
raise the price of non-government credit. 93 If the interest rates 
rise enough because of these risks, it may overwhelm the 
changes in interest rates that the ECB is trying to establish for 
purposes of monetary policy.94 Second, there is the liquidity 
channel.95 Government bonds play an important role as 
collateral in the money market, the point of contact between 
the ECB and credit institutions.96 If there is a chance that 
banks will not be able to trade government bonds, interest 
rates will increase and trading will slow, which may impede 
monetary policy transmission.97 The final channel is the 
balance sheet channel.98 If government bonds’ yields are 
higher, then by definition the bonds’ prices are lower.99 With 
less capital, banks may extend less credit; again, the less 
money that flows through the financial system, the less 
effective the transmission of monetary policy.100  
Because of the importance of government bond markets in 
these channels, the ECB argues that it would not be able to 
implement monetary policy or maintain price stability without 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. See id.; Introductory Statement., supra note 88. 
 98. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73. 
 99. When Yield Goes Up, Price Goes Down, YAHOO! FINANCE (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/education/bond/ 
article/101195/When_Yield_Goes_Up_Price_Goes_Down. 
 100. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73. 
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action.101 Therefore, it is necessary for the ECB to moderate 
dysfunctional markets with the SMP.102 Because the ECB’s 
treaty powers are unequivocal about its responsibility to 
implement monetary policy and maintain price stability103 and 
the ECB is allowed to purchase bonds from the secondary 
market,104 the ECB argues that it has the legal authority to 
implement the SMP in order to fulfill its mandate.105  
The ECB’s argument concerning the implementation of 
monetary polic is compelling in some respects, but ultimately 
unsatisfying. It is true that if the ECB is going to implement 
monetary policy, it needs to have functioning mechanisms 
through which it can transfer its policies into the economy at 
large. Given the importance of sovereign debt markets, they 
likely play an important role in this transfer. However, there is 
scant limiting principle in the ECB’s explanation. Seemingly, 
the ECB is asking for carte blanche to implement new 
programs provided their justifications are based on ensuring its 
ability to implement monetary policy. Such wide authority 
could allow the ECB to act for any reason as long as its nominal 
reason is monetary policy. If they do act for other reasons, for 
example to prop up fledgling Member States, the ECB would 
exceed the power ceded to the ECB by the Member States.  
 
iii. Sterilization and Price Stability 
Although the Treaty requires the ECB to define and 
implement monetary policy, it also requires monetary policy to 
be oriented toward the ECB’s primary mandate: price 
stability.106 When the ECB buys sovereign debt with euros, it is 
injecting money in the economy. When the ECB increases the 
monetary base, it could cause inflation to rise over the ECB’s 
target, potentially altering its monetary stance and 
jeopardizing price stability.107  
The ECB insists that is not engaged in quantitative easing 
or debt monetization and that price stability maintains it 
primary focus despite the SMP.108 This is because the ECB 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. TFEU art. 127(1)–(2).  
 104. See id., art. 123; ECB Statute art. 18(1). 
 105. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.  
 106. TFEU art. 127(1)–(2).  
 107. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73.  
 108. Id. 
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sterilizes every euro it injects into the economy through the 
SMP by removing euros from the economy in an equal 
amount.109 Because sterilization prevents the SMP from 
increasing the amount of euros in the economy, the ECB’s 
monetary stance as a whole, it argues, remains unaltered.110 
Sterilization also lends credibility to the ECB’s commitment to 
price stability, which critically reassures investors.111 
Critics of the SMP are skeptical about the effectiveness of 
the ECB’s sterilization because the ECB has also pursued a 
very accommodating monetary policy throughout the lifespan of 
the SMP. The ECB has offered unlimited loans through its 
refinancing operations as another non-standard measure to 
support liquidity.112 If a bank  deposits money with the ECB, as 
part of the ECB’s sterilization efforts, and then is able to take 
out a loan the next day from the ECB, critics argue that the 
sterilization is not effective.113 If the banks want more credit, 
and by extension allow an increase in the monetary base, they 
are free do so.  
 
iv. A Limited, Emergency Measure 
Jürgen Stark, formerly of the ECB’s executive board, 
 
 109. See The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, supra note 60, at 73. 
When ECB purchases sovereign debt through the SMP, it increases the 
amount of euros in the economy. By having banks deposit an equal amount of 
euros through weekly liquidity absorption operations, the ECB is decreasing 
the amount of euros in the economy by an equal amount so that the SMP will 
have a net-neutral effect on the money supply. See Liquidity Analysis: 
Monetary Policy Portfolios, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 110. See id.; The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 753.  
 111. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73 
(explaining how sterilization confirms the ECB’s commitment to price 
stability, and how credibility is essential in maintaining price stability). 
 112. Ansgar Belke, Driven the by Markets? ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases 
and the Securities Market Programme, Directorate General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Dept. A: Economic and Scientific Policies, Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (June 8, 2010), at 7. See also Tracy Alloway, Sterilised and 
Scandalised, FT.COM/ALPHAVILLE (May 18, 2010, 8:15 AM), 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/05/18/233726/sterilised-and-scandalised/. 
 113. Lecture by Markus C. Kerber: The ECB Under Fire, OPEN EUROPE 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=1660 
[hereinafter ECB Under Fire]. The ECB has also failed to fully sterilize the 
SMP on several occasions, see Jana Randow, ECB Fails to Sterilize Bond 
Purchases With Deposits, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/ecb-fails-to-sterilize-bond-
purchases-for-third-time-since-program-began.html, though the infrequency 
with which this has occurred indicates that it is not a major concern as of now. 
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focused on defining the SMP as a temporary measure to ensure 
that the SMP was not being used for fiscal purposes. He 
insisted that “the ECB has entered a terrain in which it should 
not stay longer than absolutely necessary” and that the SMP 
would be phased out as soon as it has resolved the dysfunction 
of the government bond markets.114 Stark argued in February 
2011 that the temporary nature of the SMP, as well the “clearly 
limited scope and scale of our outright purchases in securities 
markets . . .  has also mitigated any blurring of monetary and 
fiscal responsibilities.”115  
Stark subsequently resigned because of the expansion of 
the SMP in August 2011, 116  indicating that the ECB’s 
prudence and self-restraint may not have been sufficient to 
contain the SMP. Indeed, other ECB officials, including 
Trichet, have been reticent to point out specific limitations in 
duration or size of the SMP.117 In the three months following 
reactivation of the SMP in early August 2011, the value of 
government bonds on the ECB’s balance sheet has increased by 
€100 billion, compared to the €75 billion accumulated in the 
fifteen preceding months.118 As a result of such actions, 
analysts and bank insiders believe that the ECB can legally go 
as far as it wants in purchasing government bonds.119 
Professor Marcus Kerber, who filed a lawsuit against the 
ECB over the SMP in September 2011, echoes the concerns by 
Stark.120 Professor Kerber insists that continuing to justify the 
SMP under the premise of emergency action is disingenuous. 
He stated that there are no permanent emergencies and that 
the ECB has in effect assimilated the SMP into its standard 
monetary policy.121 Because the ECB has only justified the 
SMP as an emergency measure, Kerber argues, it is now 
overstepping what it is legally allowed to do.122 
 
 114. Central Banking after the Financial Crisis, supra note 80. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Marc Jones, ECB's Spent 14 bln Euros on Bonds Ahead of Stark Exit, 
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/12/ecb-
bonds-idUSEAP50OC3520110912. 
 117. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 75 
(explaining that the SMP is “time-bound in nature” but not actually specifying 
a time limit).  
 118. ECB Eurosystem Securities Market Program, supra note 65.  
 119. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66. 
 120. ECB Under Fire, supra note 113. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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B. THE SMP AS FISCAL POLICY 
Critics of the SMP claim the ECB is inappropriately 
blurring the line between fiscal and monetary policy.123 Despite 
the ECB’s insistence that the SMP was created only for 
monetary purposes, it has also had substantial fiscal effects.124 
The TEU was constructed to preserve a very high level of 
independence for the ECB,125 and that independence as 
formulated in the Treaty demands that fiscal and monetary 
policies should be separate.126 Structurally, the TFEU 
demonstrates this by providing separate spheres for the two 
realms of policy – Member States create fiscal policy and the 
ECB creates monetary policy127 If the ECB implemented the 
SMP for fiscal reasons, it may have exceeded its legal power. 
Critics of the SMP have put forward two main arguments 
that the SMP is in violation of the Treaty on European Union. 
First, the Treaty’s prohibition on purchasing sovereign debt 
directly from Member States is meant broadly to prohibit debt 
monetization. As debt can be monetized on the secondary as 
well as the primary markets, it makes little difference if the 
ECB buys sovereign debt from the primary or secondary 
markets if its purpose is debt monetization. Second, there is a 
great deal of evidence that the motivation for the SMP was 
primarily to provide support to beleaguered governments; it 
was a fiscal act. 
 
i. The Purpose of Article 123 
Article 123’s prohibition on direct government bond 
purchases by the ECB is not an end unto itself but an effort to 
restrain central bank support for government spending.128 
Making the prohibition applicable only to purchases of 
government bonds on the primary market was an imperfect 
solution to preventing debt monetization because debt 
 
 123. See, e.g., Axel Weber, President, Deutsche Bundesbank, Keynote 
Speech at the Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC) Symposium: 
Monetary Policy After the Crisis: A European Perspective (Oct. 12, 2010), 
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r101018a.pdf?frames=0. 
 124. See supra notes 51–64, 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 19–36 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 11–18, 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 127. See TFEU art. 120–26 (economic policy) and art. 127–38. 
 128. See generally supra notes 11–18, 25–36 and accompanying text 
(discussing how politicians can pressure a central bank to support government 
spending through debt monetization). 
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monetization can still occur by purchasing government debt 
from the secondary market.129 ECB officials themselves 
acknowledge that outright purchases of government bonds 
could be the beginning of debt monetization, even on secondary 
markets.130 Although a general prohibition on purchasing any 
government bonds would have been more effective at 
preventing debt monetization,131 such a provision was not 
practicable because of the need to use sovereign debt in 
implementing monetary policy.132 
Former German President Christian Wulff, among others, 
has suggested that Article 123’s prohibition must be 
understood as a prohibition against debt monetization in a 
broader sense and not strictly against debt monetization 
through direct purchases of government bonds.133  He stated 
that “this ban only makes sense if those responsible don’t 
circumvent it with comprehensive purchases on the secondary 
market.”134 This sentiment is in accord with the idea that when 
independent central banks purchase government bonds from 
secondary markets, they still should do so exclusively for 
monetary and not quasi-fiscal purposes.135  
Acknowledging that it is possible to monetize sovereign 
debt on secondary markets and that outright purchasing of 
sovereign debt is the first step to do so, it is therefore possible 
that the SMP is a program that is monetizing debt. If the 
Article 123 is understood as a broader prohibition against debt 
monetization, the ECB would therefore be in violation of the 
Treaty.  
 
ii. Fiscal Motivation 
There is no smoking gun from ECB officials that 
demonstrates that the SMP was created for fiscal reasons. In 
fact ECB officials have consistently couched the SMP in terms 
of monetary policy.136 However, the way in which the ECB used 
 
 129. See Bofinger, supra note 27. 
 130. Stark, supra 82 (“[O]utright purchases of government debt . . . might 
be perceived as a first step towards a monetisation of government debt.”). 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 24–28. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 31–36. 
 133. Paul Carrel, German President Questions Legality of ECB Bond Buys, 
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/ecb-
germany-bonds-idUSL5E7JO15720110824. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Lybek, supra note 28, at 7. 
 136. See The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 73 
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the SMP in conjunction with fiscal events and institutions 
indicates that the ECB acted for fiscal reasons. 
Professor Kreber described the SMP as fiscal policy, 
specifically as it applied to Italy.137 Kreber offered two pieces of 
evidence for this: the communication between Trichet and 
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and the sheer amount of 
support given to Italy through the SMP.138 The communication 
was a letter sent by Trichet and then-ECB Governing Council 
Member, now-ECB President, Mario Draghi to the Italian 
Prime Minister.139 In the letter, the ECB outlined fiscal steps 
that it viewed as essential for Italy.140 The Italian government’s 
compliance with the ECB’s demands resulted in the ECB 
reactivating the SMP on a very large scale to relieve the 
market pressure on the Italian bond market.141 In other words, 
Kreber argues, the ECB threatened to discontinue giving the 
Italian bond market buoyancy in order to force Italy to comply 
with its demands for specific fiscal measures.142 This cause-
and-effect relationship between fiscal policy and the SMP 
demonstrates that the SMP was implemented for fiscal 
reasons.143 In addition, the ECB’s use of the SMP as a carrot for 
Italian budgetary reform represents an indirect but real foray 
by the ECB into establishing a Member State’s fiscal policy.144 
The relationship between the EFSF and the SMP also 
suggests the SMP has fiscal motivations. ECB officials have 
characterized the SMP as a “bridge” until the EFSF has more 
financial ability to intervene.145 Yet, the EFSF was set up 
 
(“However, we have not gone beyond the goal of re-establishing a more correct 
transmission of our monetary policy. We have not changed our monetary 
policy stance . . .”). 
 137. ECB Under Fire, supra note 113, at (11:33). 
 138. Id. at (14 :20). 
 139. Id. at (11 :52). 
 140. Mario Draghi & Jean-Claude Trichet, Trichet e Graghi: Un’azione 
Pressante Per Ristabilire la Fiducia Degli Investitori, ECONOMIA (Sept. 29, 
2011), 
http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a
5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml. 
 141. See ECB Under Fire, supra 113. 
 142. See id. at (12:00).  
 143. See id. at (14:20). 
 144. See id at (12:00). 
 145. Weidmann Warns of the Consequences of Soft Restructuring in Greece, 
EUROINTELLIGENCE (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.eurointelligence.com/eurointelligence-news/archive/single-
view/article/eu-commissioner-becomes-first-official-to-warn-about-greek-exit-
from-the-eurozone.html (“The eurosystem has acted in a phase when the fiscal 
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explicitly “to safeguard financial stability in Europe by 
providing financial assistance to euro area Member States.”146 
The SMP and the EFSF are both used to purchase bonds in 
tumultuous sovereign debt markets, but only the EFSF can 
purchase sovereign debt on the primary market.147 However, 
the difference between primary and secondary market 
purchases matters little in practical terms in distinguishing 
between fiscal and monetary motivations because either may 
be used to implement fiscal policy.148 Because the EFSF is used 
to save Member States and the SMP and the EFSF work in 
very similar ways, the SMP is also likely a creature of fiscal 
policy. 
Given the similarities between the SMP and the EFSF, the 
ECB’s insistence that it is not legally able to support the EFSF 
indicates the SMP may have been improper. For example, the 
French government among others suggested that the EFSF 
attain a banking license so that it could borrow money from the 
ECB.149 However, this suggestion was rejected both by 
Germany and the ECB.150 The Bundesbank President, Jens 
Weidmann, rejected the idea specifically because such lending 
would have amounted to monetary state financing.151 Trichet 
agreed that ECB leveraging of the EFSF would be 
‘inappropriate.’152 Given the similarities between the SMP and 
 
policy was unable to act. By doing so it built a bridge.”); see Valentina Za, ECB 
Should Stop Bond Buys Once EFSF Bolstered-Constancio, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/ecb-bonds-constancio-
idUSL5E7LA15W20111010. 
 146. About EFSF, supra note 58. 
 147. The ECB’s Response to the Recent Tensions, supra note 75; About 
EFSF, supra note 58. 
 148. Jack Ewing, Lending a Hand to Banks, but Not to Nations, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/business/global/as-european-nations-
teeter-only-lenders-get-central-banks-help.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&hp. 
 149. Mark Deen & Gabi Thesing, Baroin Says ECB Role Bolstering EFSF 
Remains ‘Best Solution’, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-19/baroin-says-ecb-role-
bolstering-efsf-remains-best-solution-.html. 
 150. Annika Breidthardt & Luke Baker, Options Left for Leveraging EFSF 
Do Not Involve ECB, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-eurozone-efsf-leverage-
idUSTRE79K64820111021. 
 151. Eva Kuehnen & Annika Breidthardt, ECB Should Stay out of EFSF 
Leveraging: Buba Chief, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/17/us-ecb-leveraging-
idUSTRE78G17B20110917. 
 152. Jeff Black & Jana Randow, Trichet Says Not ‘Appropriate’ for ECB to 
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the EFSF, it is hard to explain why the ECB’s involvement in 
the EFSF is inappropriate while implementation of the SMP is 
not. 
 
III.  THE ECB AT A CROSSROADS 
Now that the European Union has moved beyond the most 
acute dangers of the debt crisis, the European Union needs to 
ensure that such an event does not occur again. The debt crisis 
was a fiscal event; Member States borrowed to a point where 
investors doubted their ability to repay their debts.153 This 
doubtraised interest rates on government borrowing and 
threatened government defaults which in turn necessitated 
action by the ECB.154  
The ECB’s response to the sovereign debt crisis was 
necessary to prevent a meltdown of the European economy.155 
When the crisis erupted in early 2010, no European entity 
could shoulder the burden of unsound government spending 
with as much credibility or speed as the ECB.156 Without the 
SMP to quell market fears, widespread default by major 
European governments was a real possibility.157  
Now the ECB is at a point where it needs to define its role 
in future crises.  As one ECB official stated, “[I]f a central bank 
comes under pressure in times of crisis, and succumbs to that 
pressure, it is very unlikely to exit from such extraordinary 
measures in a timely manner. This may unanchor inflation 
expectations . . . .”158 Not only may the ECB not exit its crisis 
measures in a timely manner, but by acting to prevent the 
fiscal collapse of Members States, it has signaled to Member 
States that it will act if needed. The knowledge that the ECB 
will and can act to drive down bond yields of targeted countries 
significantly weakens each Member State’s incentive to follow a 
prudent fiscal course. If the market demands too high a risk 
premium from a Member State, the ECB will counter. So, given 
 
Leverage EFSF, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/trichet-says-financial-market-
tensions-may-slow-expansion.html. 
 153. See Thompson, supra note 54. 
 154. Id. 
   155.    See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 49–68, 151–153 and accompanying text. 
 158. Jürgen Stark, Mem. ECB Exec. Bd., European Central Bank, Speech 
at the 13th Annual Emerging Markets Conference 2011: The Global Financial 
Crisis and the Role of Monetary Policy (Sept. 24, 2011). 
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the ECB’s willingness to act, it is necessary to examine whether 
the ECB’s ability to act should be modified. 
This Note identifies three possible ways forward. First, the 
ECB could continue to muddle along, skirting the line between 
monetary and fiscal policy. Second, the Member States could 
eschew the strict division between monetary and fiscal policy 
by revising the ECB’s mandate allowing the ECB to concern 
itself equally with both price stability and economic growth. 
This legitimizes tools such as the SMP to some extent. Finally, 
the solution endorsed by this Note: the ECB’s ability to 
intervene in government debt markets could be limited so as to 
adhere more strictly to the principles laid down in the TFEU. 
 
A. THE MEMBER STATES’ CURRENT FISCAL CONTEXT 
Changes have been put in place in order to prevent another 
crisis. Two major breakdowns in the European Monetary Union 
allowed the debt crisis to occur. First, the oversight system of 
the SGP and “peer pressure” from other Member States failed 
to force other Member States to keep sound public finances.159 
Second, bond market participants failed to demand sufficiently 
varying risk premia from euro zone countries based on an 
assessment of each country’s financial situation.160 With 
pressure from other Member States and the markets failing to 
materialize, some Member States did not implement structural 
change, accumulated large debts and their potential defaults 
threatened the European financial system. 
After the debt crisis, pressure on Member States to take a 
prudent approach to their finances has ratcheted up. Member 
States reinvigorated the SGP to give oversight of each other’s 
finances more teeth.161 Member States signed the Treaty on 
Stability which allowed stiffer penalties for excessive debts or 
 
 159. Peter Praet, Mem. ECB Exec. Bd., Lecture at the International Center 
for Monetary and Banking Studies: Monetary Policy at Crisis Times (Feb. 20, 
2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120220.en.html. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks on the Member State, 2011 O.J. (L 
306) 41; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12 (EU); Regulation 1173/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective 
Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L306) 1 
(EU); Council Regulation 1177/2011of 8 November 2011, 2011 O.J. (L306) 33 
(EU). 
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deficits.162 Markets now discriminate more dramatically 
between bonds from different Member States.163 Provided that 
neither Member States nor markets become lax in exerting 
pressure, such actions should provide a solid basis to prevent 
another crisis. In the case that these actions are not enough, 
Member States have assigned the Treaty Establishing ESM to 
take over the EFSF’s function as lender of last resort 
permanently, as a “firewall” to ensure all Member States 
remain solvent.164 
 
B. OPTION ONE: THE STATUS QUO 
The ECB could continue to implement the SMP on an ad 
hoc basis as it has done since the beginning of the crisis. Such 
an approach has proven to prevent default and contagion by 
giving the ECB some latitude to reassure markets that it will 
act when needed.165 It also allows the ECB nominally to remain 
faithful to its mandate of price stability by insisting that the 
SMP is a temporary, emergency measure to ensure it is able to 
implement monetary policy and provide price stability.166 This 
approach relies on the prudence of the ECB and does not 
require any revision of its powers or responsibilities. 
The status quo, however, is not the preferred choice 
because it perpetuates the ambiguous nature of the ECB’s role 
in times of crisis. While such a course would effectively split the 
baby between the proponents and opponents of the SMP, it is 
an answer that is satisfactory for neither. Instead, as the SMP 
has exemplified, such a path does not provide sufficient 
reassurance for markets or confidence in the ECB’s 
commitment to price stability.  
On the one hand, the SMP appears to have compromised 
the ECB’s commitment to price stability because it was likely 
implemented in order to prevent Member States’ defaults. The 
ECB’s ability to preserve price stability depends crucially on its 
independence.167 Its independence, in turn, depends on Member 
 
 162. See Treaty on Stability art. 8. 
 163. Compare Greece Govt. Bond 10 Year Acting as Benchmark, supra note 
51, with German Government Bonds 10 Yr Dbr, BLOOMBERG (last visited Mar. 
22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GDBR10:IND/chart. 
 164. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 39–40. 
 165. See Thompson, supra note 54. 
 166. Ewing & Minder, supra note 66. 
 167. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text. 
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States not being able to force the ECB to take action. 168 This 
includes Member States not being able to force the ECB to 
purchase government bonds because of potential insolvency. 169 
When the ECB acted to preserve Member States from 
defaulting, it acted in response to political decisions by those 
Member States, undermining its independence and potentially 
its price stability. 
On the other hand, the SMP was likely less effective than 
it could have been in easing tensions in the short-term.170 With 
prominent critics, such as the Bundesbank, voicing concerns 
over the SMP’s legality, some investors were skeptical that the 
ECB would deploy its limitless balance sheet and fully act as a 
backstop to Member States threatened with default.171 As a 
consequence, investors demanded higher risk premia than they 
may have if there were no doubt that the ECB would purchase 
unlimited amounts of bonds.172 While providing some buoyancy, 
the status quo has not prevented as much nervousness as an 
unbridled intervention into government bond markets by the 
ECB would have. 
 
C. OPTION TWO: EXPAND THE ECB’S MANDATE 
The second option is to expand the ECB’s mandate and 
allow it to pursue economic goals as a coequal goal with price 
stability. This option would involve balancing the economic 
imperatives of the EU against price stability and would allow 
the ECB to intervene in bond markets explicitly for economic 
reasons as is the case in other major economies.173 A dual 
 
 168. See supra notes 11–28 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Kocherlakota, supra note 18. 
 170. See James Wilson, Bundesbank Squares up to ECB’s Draghi, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 1, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb335298-
63be-11e1-8762-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1pa55qxck. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Simon Kennedy, Italy Bond Attack Breaches Euro Defenses As Crisis 
Worsens, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
11-09/italy-bond-attack-breaches-euro-s-defenses-as-region-s-contagion-
worsens.html; see generally Ewing, supra note 154. 
 173. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2010) (“The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall 
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, 
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, 
and moderate long-term interest rates.”); Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 10(2) 
(listing the central bank’s goals as: the stability of the currency of Australia, 
the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and the economic prosperity 
and welfare of the people of Australia); see also Joe Weisenthal, LOOK: 
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mandate would free the ECB to pursue policies, such as the 
SMP, that may unmoor inflation expectations to some degree 
but would also give confidence to investors that the ECB will 
backstop precarious markets and prevent Member States from 
defaulting.174 Given that preventing default of Member States 
or languid economic growth within the EU are certainly 
economic goals of the Member States,175 tools such as the SMP 
would then more comfortably fit within the ECB’s mandate and 
may be viewed as legitimate.  
Giving the ECB express authority to intervene in the 
markets to prevent default or stimulate growth would likely 
help to improve the short-term economic stability in the EU. By 
knowing the ECB will intervene if needed, markets will likely 
be less prone to large fluctuations because market participants 
will be more confident that the ECB’s limitless balance sheet 
will provide a backstop to rising bond yields.  Having the ECB 
use its balance sheet as a tool for fiscal stability is an approach 
that has worked to a limited degree through programs such as 
the SMP.176 It is also an approach that has been encouraged by 
some Member States and other major economies, such as the 
United States, in the context of the ECB providing funding to 
the EFSF, but this approach was subsequently rejected as 
exceeding the ECB’s mandate.177  
Such an approach would be an overt affirmation of what 
commentators and market participants already assume will 
happen. Many commentators believe that because the ECB is 
the only credible backstop to Member States defaulting, it will 
need to expand the role it is already playing in purchasing 
bonds.178 Some market participants are testing the ECB’s 
 
There's One Solution For Europe, Everyone Knows What It Is, And If It Doesn't 
Happen, There Will Be A Collapse, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2011, 8:00 
pm), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-save-the-eurozone-2011-11 
(“Every other major economy in the world [besides the EU]: Japan, the UK, 
the US, China, etc. has a central bank that funds the government.”). 
 174. Kennedy, supra note 172. 
 175. TFEU art. 127. 
 176. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., Deen & Thesing, supra note 149; Rainer Buergin & Jonathan 
Stearns, Germany Rejects Using ECB to Lift EFSF Rescue-Fund Firepower, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-17/germany-rejects-using-ecb-to-
lift-efsf-rescue-fund-firepower.html. 
 178. Jack Ewing, Lending a Hand to Banks, but Not to Nations, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/business/global/as-european-nations-
DOELY - Securities Markets Programme (22 MINN J INTL L 214 (Winter 2013)) 2/21/2013  1:51 PM 
2013] SECURITIES MARKETS PROGRAMME 241 
 
willingness to purchase unlimited amounts of government 
bonds.179 So, moving from tacitly accepting the responsibility 
for stabilizing financial markets and encouraging growth in the 
short-term to explicitly accepting this responsibility may 
amount more to a change in rhetoric than to a shift in policy.  
This Note chooses not to endorse this approach for two 
reasons. First, the TFEU clearly contemplates a division of 
fiscal and monetary policies.180 The reason for this division is to 
preserve the independence of the ECB and maintain price 
stability.181 This was the deal brokered by the Member States 
as part of the grand bargain in creating the EU. The Member 
States wanted fiscal decisions to be made by the Member 
States. Leaving fiscal decisions with the Member States 
ensures that those making such decisions are, appropriately, 
politically accountable. It provides long-term confidence to 
markets by ensuring price stability. Therefore, the ECB’s 
singular adherence to price stability should be maintained.  
Second, allowing the ECB to backstop struggling countries 
still threatens the ECB’s independence. Such an approach puts 
great confidence in the revamped fiscal oversight that has 
transpired since the debt crisis and effectively removes the 
market discipline imposed on Member States through different 
interest rates for different Member States.182 Politicians and 
market participants would ideally have a long memories and 
act diligently to ensure budgetary discipline, especially given 
the recent structural changes regarding accountability between 
Member States. However, knowing that there is a safety net 
may encourage Member States to slip back into complacency 
and take on more debt than they are able to service.183 If debt 
loads are too burdensome because of deficits, Member States 
could force the ECB to take action again. If the ECB is so forced 
 
teeter-only-lenders-get-central-banks-help.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&hp; 
Andreas Cremer, Euro Zone Hangs on ECB Bond Buying, Krugman Tells 
Handelsblatt, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-10/euro-zone-hangs-on-ecb-bond-
buying-krugman-tells-handelsblatt.html; Simon Kennedy, Italy Bond Attack 
Breaches Euro Defenses As Crisis Worsens, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-09/italy-bond-attack-breaches-euro-
s-defenses-as-region-s-contagion-worsens.html. 
 179. See Ewing & Minder, supra note 66. 
 180. See TFEU arts. 120–26 (economic policy) and arts. 127–33 (monetary 
policy). 
 181. See supra notes 11–17, 24–36 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 167–170. 
 183. See Ewing & Minder, supra note 66. 
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to take action, it cannot be acting independently. This would 
undermine a bedrock principle of monetary policy. 
 
D. OPTION THREE: LIMITING THE ECB’S ABILITY TO 
INTERVENE IN MARKETS 
The third option is to limit the ECB’s ability to intervene in 
markets with tools such as the SMP and thereby firmly limit 
the ECB’s ability to engage in quasi-fiscal activities. Such an 
approach would preserve the division between monetary and 
fiscal policy as envisioned by the framers of the TEU. While not 
providing the short-term stability offered by option two, 
limiting the ECB would help to reaffirm the independence of 
the ECB and anchor price stability to encourage long-term 
growth.  
 
i. Proposed Limitations 
Member States should restrict the ECB’s ability to engage 
in quasi-fiscal activities by limiting the amount of sovereign 
debt the ECB is able to hold; the ECB should also permanently 
end the SMP as soon as the ESM is operational. This 
restriction should not affect government bonds used as 
collateral by banks engaged in open market operations with the 
ECB. It should allow the ECB to engage in fine-tuning 
operations by outright sale and purchase of government bonds 
on a scale consistent with conventional fine-tuning operations. 
This restriction would leave the ECB with full discretion to 
determine the appropriate monetary policy and implement it 
using its standard tools, but it would also significantly limit the 
ECB’s ability to make targeted interventions into government 
bond markets. 
This restriction would be a supplementary provision to 
Article 123’s prohibition on debt monetization and would 
reestablish the ECB’s commitment to price stability. As Article 
123 prohibits the ECB from engaging in debt monetization 
through the primary markets,184 this new restriction would 
restrain the ECB from engaging in debt monetization through 
the secondary markets. In implementing this measure, the 
Member States would remedy an imperfection in the original 
prohibition on debt monetization: the ECB is currently able to 
monetize debt by purchasing government bonds on the 
secondary market.  
 
 184. TFEU art. 123. 
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Unlike reformation of the ECB’s mandate, this solution 
would enlist markets to impose discipline on Member States. 
Removing the ability for the ECB to intervene on a large scale 
in government bond markets will send a strong signal to 
market participants that they must diligently evaluate each 
Member State’s finances and set that State’s interest rates 
accordingly. Pricing government bonds in such a way will allow 
each Member State to borrow in accordance with the soundness 
of their finances. While the newly implemented fiscal restraints 
and oversight within the EU will hopefully prove effective, this 
solution will employ the markets as an additional means to 
exert pressure on Member States. 
 
ii. Ending the SMP 
The ECB should transfer the balance of the SMP to the 
ESM when the ESM is operational. The ESM will have a 
sufficient balance sheet,185 and the ESM was created explicitly 
to prevent the insolvency of Member States. As laid out in the 
Treaty, the ESM is meant “to mobilise funding and provide 
stability support . . . to the benefit of ESM Members which are 
experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, 
if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole and of its Member States.”186 In other words, 
the ESM is structured to be the firewall that the SMP was 
previously. It should be employed for that purpose.187 
In addition, the responsibility for backstopping potentially 
insolvent Member States is more appropriately reposed with 
the Member States. As laid out in the TFEU, fiscal policies are 
the responsibility of the Member States.188  Deciding whether 
to intervene in government bond markets and preventing the 
default of Member States has reverberating implications for 
other Member States. When an EU institution takes on the 
debt of a Member State, all members of the institution will 
suffer a loss in the case of that Member State’s default. Because 
of potential fiscal implications for each of the Member States 
and their electorates, such decisions should be left to the 
 
 185. Compare the current holdings by the ECB under the SMP, ECB 
Eurosystem Securities Market Program, supra note 65 (€218 billion as of 
March 22, 2012), with the lending capacity of the ESM, Treaty Establishing 
ESM art. 41 (€500 billion). 
 186. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 3. 
 187. Kennedy, supra note 178. 
 188. See TFEU art. 120. 
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politically accountable governmental bodies. In addition, when 
extending credit through the ESM, Member States may attach 
conditions to the loans.189 The ability formally to tie an 
extension of credit to structural and budgetary changes for a 
Member State provides more accountability and transparency 
than informal conditions that the ECB may require.190 
 
iii. Potential Concerns 
Some question exists as to how much debt the EFSF/ESM 
can shoulder because of its finite balance sheet. 191 Such 
uncertainty may make market participants nervous and may 
put short-term stability in question. However, while market 
stability is a concern, it should not prohibit taking this step. 
The reasons such concerns should not be prohibitive are both 
fundamental to the nature of the EU and practical in light of 
the ESM and the ECB’s resistance to large scale intervention. 
This proposal is laid out as a way to preserve the 
fundamental division contemplated in the TFEU, not to salve 
markets. That division was made to ensure the ECB’s 
independence, price stability and the Member States’ long-term 
fiscal discipline. Market confidence in the ECB stems from its 
infinite balance sheet,192 but if the ECB was actually to employ 
that balance sheet it could undermine its independence and 
price stability. Such action would therefore likely exceed the 
level of power and responsibility ceded by the Member States to 
the ECB in the formation of the European Union. Efforts to 
continue reserving to the Member States those powers they 
intended not to cede should therefore trump short-term market 
demands. 
From a more practical perspective, the ESM should be able 
to handle the amount of government bonds that have been 
acquired by the ECB through the SMP.193 It is possible that the 
new measure would exacerbate the demand put on the ESM 
because the belief that the ECB would intervene if needed 
 
 189. Treaty Establishing ESM art. 12 (“Such conditionality may range 
from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous respect of pre-
established eligibility conditions.”). 
 190. See supra notes 143–148 and accompanying text. 
 191. Willem Buiter, EFSF Needs Bigger Bazooka to Maximise Its 
Firepower, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4886f7a-03d3-11e1-bbc5-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ckfBgwG5. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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would no longer exist and the volatility in government bond 
markets could increase. However, this concern should not be 
overstated. Public questioning of the SMP’s legality has 
tempered market participants’ expectations that the ECB will 
use its balance sheet.194 While the current state of the 
government bond markets reflects some expectation that the 
ECB will intervene, that expectation is tempered by the ECB’s 
resistance to further intervention.195 Therefore, the change in 
short-term stability resulting from the ESM, not the ECB, 
being responsible for intervention may not be as pronounced as 
some would expect. 
 
iv. Adherence to the TFEU’s Principals 
This solution stays in line with the broad principles of the 
TFEU. In constructing the EMU, Member States gave the ECB 
one primary mandate: price stability.196 The Member States 
retained for themselves their fiscal policy.197 To preserve the 
ECB’s independence, and hence price stability, fiscal and 
monetary matters are insulated from each other through 
provisions such as the prohibition on monetary financing.198 
Given these guiding principles, a limit on the amount of 
sovereign debt the ECB may purchase would help to preserve 
its independence and price stability by removing the legal 
ambiguity. 
In addition, the ECB would likely welcome this limitation 
on their ability. Just as the ECB has demonstrated that it will 
respond when needed to preserve the EMU,199 it has also 
demonstrated that it will not work outside the letter of the 
Treaty.200 Commentators have noted that the ECB is 
uncomfortable with the SMP and looks forward to its 
discontinuance.201 European Central Bank officials have stated 
 
 194. Wilson, supra note 170. 
 195. See Gabi Thesing, ECB Seeks to Shed ‘Uncomfortable’ Bond-Buying 
Duty: Euro Credit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/ecb-seeks-to-shift-uncomfortable-
bond-buying-to-rescue-fund-euro-credit.html. 
 196. TFEU art. 127. 
 197. Id. art. 120. 
 198. See supra notes 11–36 and accompanying text. See Lybek, supra note 
28, at 7 (advocating a prohibition for central banks on quasi-fiscal activities). 
 199. See generally supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Gabi Thesing, ECB Seeks to Shed ‘Uncomfortable’ Bond-Buying 
Duty: Euro Credit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2011), 
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that it should not allow the program to continue longer than 
necessary.202 Just as ECB officials supported handing over the 
task of capping yields to the EFSF,203 it will likely welcome 
handing it over to the EFSF’s successor, the EMS. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has described the motives and the purposes of 
the SMP in regards to the ECB’s independence and mandate. 
The TEU granted the ECB a very large amount of 
independence, most notably for this Note through the 
prohibition on debt monetization. However, having been 
confronted by the European sovereign debt crisis, the ECB had 
to implement the SMP in order to keep sovereign debt markets 
functioning. Although the ECB has always described the SMP 
in terms of monetary policy, there are plausible fiscal 
motivations for the SMP. Through ambiguity in the Treaty, the 
ECB has been able to stave off greater crisis in the euro zone. 
However, the current lack of limits on the SMP, the 
questionable effectiveness of the ECB’s sterilization of the bond 
purchases and the ready fiscal explanation of the SMP threaten 
to compromise the ECB’s independence and adherence to price 
stability. The more appropriate organ to deal with potential 
Member State insolvency is the ESM. Therefore, this Note 
suggests limiting the amount of government bonds that the 
ECB may purchase and transferring the balance of the SMP to 
the ESM. This will put further legal restrictions on the ECB’s 
ability to monetize debt which will reaffirm the ECB’s 
independence and commitment to price stability, as well as 
allow market pressures to instill discipline in government fiscal 
policy. 
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has entered a terrain in which it should not stay longer than absolutely 
necessary.”). 
 203. See Thesing, supra note 201. 
